Every so often, I debate a on-line friend on the issue of “intangibles” in hockey. The latest debate was inspired by Jonathan Willis’s article. I agreed with Willis’s argument that intangibles shouldn’t be used to explain things, or explain away things, that can otherwise be objectively measured. Willis wrote:
“I think intangibles matter. It’s just that all too often they’re used as a catch-all explanation for anything that happens on the ice even when a tangible explanation exists. Too often the false narratives arising from them lead to poor conclusions, like the idea that Nurse’s fight led the Oilers to a great first period. Too often they’ve been used as supports for ineffective players, and cudgels with which to club effective ones, as tools to further the predetermined opinion of a pundit.”
My friend challenged me with the question: “Surely to a certain degree you agree intangibles exist?”
[In response, I wrote:] It’s not that I don’t believe intangibles don’t exist; but they don’t exist in the way Willis argues that some people use them: As explanations for why something happened when there are more observable reasons for why it happened.
True, we cannot see into a player’s head to know what is motivating him at one time or another; his mood; his restfulness; whether he feels confident or not before the game; how the coach’s feedback is impacting him; how scoring or not scoring is affecting his confidence; and so forth. Yet, these “intangibles” are not intangible at all in psychology: We measure them all the time. It’s just that we don’t measure them in hockey.
Come think to think of it, I guess I’m saying intangibles–as they pertain to psychological explanations–don’t exist. Everything about a player or team is measurable; it’s just not practical or possible to measure everything in the context of a game.
[I then recalled some comments McLellan made after the recent Los Angeles game, in which he made psychological observations of his players.]
Observant and motivating coaches try to be sensitive to the psychology of his players. For instance, McLellan noted some slouched shoulders after LA scored 3 goals. He said he saw their play deteriorate after that happened, but then they recovered in the 3rd period. This kind of observation can be checked by looking at shot metrics.
After the 3rd goal, LA kept pressing until they took a penalty. Then the Oilers recovered a little and scored, but then LA took over again, leading to the 4th goal, then kept on rolling to the end of the period. So McLellan’s observation was spot on.
The Oilers came out gangbusters to start the 3rd, although LA was keeping pace. Still, the Oil scored. So McLellan noted that too, but he may have glossed over the rest of the period in his memory. After this initial push and goal, penalties happened. Then Edmonton was flat until the last few minutes, at which point it was too late.
So in this case, even an intangible–a coach’s observation of player confidence and effort–can be indirectly measured by the shot attempt battle.
It’s not always a happy marriage between analytics, intangibles, and psychology, but there are occasions–as above–when a psychological motivation (a supposed intangible) can be observed via the players’s disposition and then indirectly tested by the events on the ice.
The latest trade rumour became reality: This morning, the Edmonton Oilers traded goalie, Ben Scrivens, for Montreal Canadiens’ forward, Zack Kassian. Due to a strong training camp by Anders Nilsson, Scrivens had been demoted to the Oilers’ AHL-affiliate, the Bakersfield Condors. Zack Kassian has a checkered history, which includes on-ice antics, such as his slew foot on Eberle (Nov. 1, 2014), and a recent rehabilitation for alcohol abuse.
Quoting Wikipedia: “On October 4th, 2015, Kassian was involved in an accident on a non practice day, suffering a broken nose and fractured left foot. Kassian was not the driver of the car, however he was under the influence, which resulted in him being suspended without pay and sent to the NHL’s substance abuse program.
On December 15, 2015, after successfully completing the substance abuse program, the NHL announced Kassian’s return from suspension. However, only a few hours after the announcement, the Canadiens put him on waivers.”
That’s the downside of Kassian. On the upside, he is in prime at 24 years of age. Although his overall production isn’t spectacular–35 goals & 31 assists in 198 NHL games–more refined analysis of his even-strength performance suggests he has a strong scoring touch. The following two charts show his production, possession, and passing metrics.
Glossary for Passing Metrics
The HERO chart, which teases apart his production and possession metrics, suggests that on both metrics that he is a solid bottom-6 forward. What stands out, of course, is his goal-scoring rate, which is comparable to top-line forwards. His even-strength career scoring rate (i.e., shooting%) is 13.5%, which is above average even for a top-6 forward.
What about the influence of playing with Henrik and Daniel Sedin while playing in Vancouver? At even-strength, 10 of his 35 goals were scored with the Sedins in which he scored at an unsustainable rate of 22%. Without the Sedins, his career scoring rate is a more plausible 11.7%, which is still high-end for a bottom-6 forward.
However, if we look at his passing metrics (2nd graph), we see that he does not contribute all that much to offense. His Corsi (i.e., shot attempt) Contributions are on the low side, quite low in fact. Even accounting for time-on-ice by using ‘per 60 minute’ breakdowns, he’s not doing a lot to generate offense. But at the same time, if we look to the right of the graph and note his contributions to scoring chances, he looks very good; way above average. He doesn’t do a lot, but when he does, he’s heavy on quality chances.
One way to look at Kassian’s passing and shooting is that he favours quality over quantity. For a bottom-6 forward, I find it hard to complain about that. The more scoring depth for the Oilers, the better. Relative to the Oilers current bottom-6, Kassian is a definite upgrade. Moreover, as to the struggling power-play, I would definitely prefer seeing Kassian than Korpikoski.
Even if this trade doesn’t pan out, I don’t think the Oilers lose in this trade. But if he does become a strong possession and producing depth forward, then he is another valuable piece to the puzzle.
What are your thoughts on Kassian? I was skeptical given his history, but his metrics suggest this could be a good find for Chiarelli.
Who doesn’t like to see their team winning? Does it matter why the team won? To the everyday fan, the ‘why’ doesn’t matter: Their team scored more goals than the opposition. End of story. Plus, wins leave you elated with the feeling that anything is possible. But if the fan wants to see a consistently competitive team, a team that is a regular playoff contender, how the team wins matters tremendously. When I focus on the question of why for the Oilers, I cannot help but conclude that the recent wins are deceiving.
With that in mind, I want to ease readers into my analysis of the Oilers’ progress compared to last season. Looking at the analysis one way, the results are promising, but in another way, the results can be slightly discouraging.
In a previous post, I explained how I computed my progress indices by comparing games to the respective 2014/15 season series. Why I used this comparative analysis is because simply looking at their current Weighted Shot (WghSh) or Shot Attempt (SAT) differentials, we don’t take into account the Oilers’ quality of competition. For instance, in their first 10 games, the Oilers played 7 games against top-5 teams (as measured by Weighted Shot differentials). We would not expect the Oilers’ shot metric differentials to be all that great against the best teams, so how would we know whether they’ve improved?
But if we compare their shot metrics from each game to their 2014/15 season series metrics (vs. the same team), we take care of quality of competition. For example, if last season the Oilers’ average SAT% against Los Angeles was 45%, but they achieved 48% this season, that would be a relative improvement, even though 48% is a poor differential in an absolute sense. If their SAT% against Buffalo was 54% last season, but only 51% this season, this would be a worse performance relatively speaking, even though 51% is a good differential in general.
Using data from war-on-ice, I compared 4 shot metrics from every game. For those unfamiliar to hockey analytics, the most confusing metric is Weighted Shots. I borrow from Matt Cane’s model that places 5 times more weight on goals versus shot attempts. That means both goals and shot attempts are part of Weighted Shots with goals getting 1 point and shot attempts receiving 0.2 points.
The 2nd metric is simply shot attempts (SAT), which includes blocked shots, missed shots, and shots on goal. SAT (a.k.a. Corsi) has been shown to be one the best predictors of a team’s future goal differential. Weighted Shots are also strong predictors, slightly better than shot attempts in fact, but to tease apart defense from goaltender performance, and offense from “puck luck,” (i.e., statistically high scoring rates) then shot metrics, like SAT, that exclude goals are useful. The 3rd metric is Scoring Chances (SC; defined by war-on-ice), which helps account for shot quality. The 4th metric is a proxy for the highest quality shot, which are scoring chances from the slot and are called High Danger Scoring Chances (HSC; defined by war-on-ice).
Shot Differentials
With our metrics defined, let’s have a look at their 2015/16-to-2014/15 comparative differentials using 5-game blocks.
To explain the graph a bit more, each differential is computed by dividing the ‘For’ metrics by the sum of the ‘For’ and ‘Against’ metrics. For example, SAT% = Shot Attempts For / (Shot Attempts For + Shot Attempts Against). For each 5-game block, I computed the average quality of competition using Weighted Shot differentials, which I put In parentheses. Teams greater than 50% are typically playoff-bound teams. So as you can see, the first 10 games were the toughest of the season.
Although little progress is evident in the first 5 games, albeit against some very tough competition, the progress indices are consistently positive up until game 25. That is, regardless of the quality of competition, the Oilers showed improvement in shot attempt and scoring chance differentials. One qualifier, though, is their inconsistency in High Danger Scoring Chances, which I’ll talk about more below when I look at defense and offense separately.
What happened after game 25? The Oilers’ winning streak of course! It makes perfect sense! Their differentials plunge below their levels of last season and yet, they win. For games 26-29, we can thank Anders “The Giant” Nilsson. Not much else to say there. Game 30, though, was nothing short of a shooting gallery for both the Oilers and New York Rangers. As a brief respite from the shellacking from the previous 4 games, the Oilers’ progress indices in the Rangers’ game were slightly positive. (This uptick is not seen in the graph because the 5-game average is negative.)
What’s going on after game 25? Their roster has been weakened by injuries and by diminished play of a few key players. Although the team maintained their improvement after McDavid broke his collarbone–you read that correctly, the Oilers were as good without McDavid–, the loss of McDavid’s linemates, Yakupov and Pouliot, appears to be straining the team’s offense.
Defensively, Fayne struggled mightily through this period. Prior to his re-assignment to the Condors, Fayne’s (score-adjusted) Relative SAT% for the previous 5 games was -11.7%. Even worse, with Fayne on the ice, the Oilers’ Scoring Chance differential was 26.2%, which contrasts with the team’s respectable 49.8% SC% without Fayne. Finally, his Relative High Danger SC% was -27.7%. No matter how we slice the metrics, Fayne’s performance had deteriorated considerably.
To add injury to injury, Klefbom was hurt in game 30 with a broken finger. Still not sure how long he’ll be out. Nikita Nikitin has been called up to replace him. I’m not optimistic that Nikitin will outperform Fayne, never mind Klefbom, but time will tell.
I wrote the above portion before watching and compiling data from games 31 and 32, which were against Boston and New York Rangers, respectively. In Boston, Talbot rescued the Oilers from being drubbed on the scoreboard with 47 saves. Different goalie, same story. The metrics indicated a worse performance compared to last season. However, against the Rangers, the metrics indicated a slight improvement over last season.
Offense
But back to the first 30 games, let me dig a little deeper and isolate offense from defense. The Oilers are scoring more this year, but is that because they generating more quality chances? Has their defense improved? First, I’ll examine the Oilers’ offense.
Improvement in offense has been inconsistent, and even though the indices (except for HSC), on average, are positive. The lack of improvement of High Danger Scoring Chances still suggests that, like previous seasons, the Oilers still struggle to create opportunities from the slot area, whether that’s by driving to the net, passing, or increased net traffic for deflections and rebounds. Games 21 to 25 were the height of their offensive improvement, which was followed by their weakest offense of the season from games 26 to 29.
Dissecting games 21-25, the Oilers did an excellent job of generating more shot attempts (+28/60 minutes compared to 14/15) and scoring chances (+18/60) against Washington, along with solid improvement in shot attempt generation (+5/60 on average) against Carolina, Detroit, & Pittsburgh. But this increased number of attempts didn’t necessarily result in boosting their scoring chance generation against Carolina (-2.8/60) and Pittsbrugh (-5/60). Against Detroit, though, there was strong improvement in scoring chance generation (+11/60).
Breaking down offense to the level of lines (Note: These numbers are not relative to 2014/15, but simply 2015/16 figures.), the Hall–Draisaitl–Purcell combination was the primary offense-generating machine with a score-adjusted SAT% of 59.2% and a SC% of 55.1%. In terms of individual performance, Hall had 18 and Draisaitl had 13 scoring chances to lead the way with Purcell firing 11 for a total of 42. That’s just over 8 scoring chances per game for this line. The Nugent-Hopkins–Eberle–Pouliot line combined for a score-adjusted SAT% of 51.1%, but only a 36% Scoring Chance differential. Ahead in the shot attempt game, but a lack of quality shots told a different story.
As to other forwards, Pakarinen was firing strong against Carolina & Detroit with 8 total scoring chances, but nothing at all in the other 3 games. Letestu and Korpikoski also had 8 each over 5 games. Yakupov was hurt by the 2nd game into this road-trip and had 2 scoring chances in one game. Lander recorded no scoring chances at all.
The Hall–Draisaitl–Purcell combination, then, appears to have been the primary catalyst to the improved offense during this 5-game stretch.
What changed on offense from games 26 to 29? The Oilers were without Yakupov and Pouliot due to injury. In effect, the Oilers 2nd forward line (McDavid–Pouliot–Yakupov) were all out. That meant more ice-time for marginal bottom-6 players, like Korpikoski and Gazdic, along with AHLers getting more ice-time (Pakarinen) and being called up (Juhar Khaira). From games 26 onward, the bottom-6 forward’s SAT% tells us the story: Gazdic – 44%, Lander – 43%, Pakarinen – 39%, Letestu – 34%, & Korpikoski – 32%.
To put this into perspective, the 20 worst SAT differentials (T.O.I. > 200 min) in the league range from 36% to 42%. For the record, Korpikoski happens to have the worst SAT% in the league. Ouch!
Defense
Next, let’s take a look at the comparative metrics for defense.
Defensive improvement, at least measured with Scoring Chances Against, had been consistent to game 25, but like the offense, dropped dramatically from game 26 onward. I already noted Fayne’s struggles, along with the entire loss of the 2L forwards to injury. These same roster deficiencies also help explain the team’s weakened defense. But is anyone else on defense that we can turn the analytical eye? This analysis won’t be popular, but here I go.
Nurse: Baptism by Fire
McLellan has been deploying Darnell Nurse as a top-2 defenceman. At first, things were going well. But as of late, Nurse’s game has soured a bit. Jonathan Willis gives his own take how Nurse’s play is not up to snuff. I would like to expand on that a bit. Willis’ article was not kindly received, if the comments section reflect the general fan-base.
With metrics, I noted how poorly the team is doing with when the bottom-6 forwards are on the ice. Nurse’s numbers are no better. From game 26 onward, the team’s SAT% with Nurse is 34%. The goal-focused fan may not have noticed though. With the Nurse on the ice, the team’s goal-differential is +1. It seems the gods of good fortune (referred to as PDO in hockey analytics) are smiling on Nurse and have blessed the team with a scoring rate of 24.2%! (The league-average scoring rate is 8%.)
With Sekera since game 26, Nurse’s numbers are not much better: Their combined SAT% is 35%. From the start of Nurse’s season, the team has allowed 28 Scoring Chances Against per hour. Relative to the other Oilers’ defense, only Fayne is worse at 29.6 per hour. In terms of Nurse’s overall Relative Scoring Chance differential (-5.3%), only Korpikoski (-9.6%) and Letestu (-6.4%) are worse. Not to imply that Nurse has been over his head the entire time. His SAT% prior to game 26 was a very respectable 48%.
G. Money, the blogger behind OilersNerdAlert.com, has developed an innovative (still tentative, but promising) metric to assess defenvemen that incorporates shot quality, namely, shot distance and shot type (e.g., slap shot, backhand, wrist shot). He calls the metric Dangerous Fenwick and it includes all unblocked shots. He has been tracking the Oilers’s metrics game-by-game. By his calculations, a Dangerous Fenwick Against (DFA) of under 39 (per hour) is “good” and conversely, greater than 39 is “bad.” From game 26 onward, Nurse’s DFA per hour is 49.9.
Finally, if we look at Nurse’s dCorsi score. Delta Corsi (dCorsi) is the difference between a player’s observed and expected SAT (a.k.a. Corsi). Expected SAT is the value an average defenceman would get in the same context (i.e., quality of competition, quality of teammates, and zone starts). Nurse’s his dCorsi is just over -8 per hour. Factor in his top-pairing ice-time, the impact on the team is a -50 shot attempt differential. In other words, he is performing well below what we would expect from an average defenceman with similar usage.
Because there is consistency in what all these metrics (Shot Attempts, Scoring Chances, Dangerous Fenwick, and dCorsi) tell us about Nurse, I believe this gives more weight to the conclusion that he is under-performing. I did not have intentions to discuss Nurse when I first started writing this article. But the more I wanted to explain why the Oilers’ woes after game 25, the more I had to break things down, which lead me to focus on a few individuals. Unfortunately, Nurse did not shine under the analytical spotlight.
The Oilers are in a defensive conundrum. Nurse is overwhelmed, and in my ideal world, should be sheltered by having him play against softer competition, if not returned to the AHL. Yet, Fayne has played so poorly that he was demoted to the AHL and now Klefbom is hurt. But if Nurse is sheltered or sent down, who takes his place? I don’t have an answer. Maybe McLellan doesn’t either. I can only assume that McLellan is deploying the best he can with who he has available to him. But the longer Nurse gets crushed in the shot counts, the more I would like to see him taken out of the limelight.
Summary
The downturn after game 25 has been substantial; wiping out improvement during first 25 games by over half. Still, shot attempt differential has improved by 2.2 per hour and scoring chance differential by 3.2 per hour (see table below). Despite the downswing, I am hopeful that first 25 games are a more reliable indicator of improvement. I believe that the Oilers’ recent struggles are mostly due to injuries rather than deteriorating play of individual players, although this is definitely part of it.
What do readers think? Are the wins enough for you? (For some, winning is enough.) Do you think the analysis above supports my conclusion, specifically, that the recent downturn is due more to injury than deteriorating play? What would you do with Nurse, if anything?
Could Nugent-Hopkins become as good as Jonathan Toews someday?
I’m flabbergasted by the amount of news coming out of the mainstream media this past couple days about the Edmonton Oilers willingness to deal Ryan Nugent-Hopkins and Jordan Eberle. It’s overwhelming to be honest. From Jim Matheson to Pierre LeBrun to Ryan Rishaug, there are some pretty big names talking about the Oilers making a huge splash to try and shake this team up.
Is this Chiarelli’s way of trying to send a message to his young stars or is this a message from the media that enough is enough? The Oilers are stuck in Auston Matthews land and it seems as if they’re going to be there for some time. But you have to know as a fan that the Oilers would never win that lottery pick if they finished in last place. So they’d have to settle for Jakob Chychrun… A potential franchise defenseman… Ouch!
IMO only untouchables are McDavid, Hall, Nurse and Draisaitl, everyone else can be moved. 93 and 14 among them if return is right.
Now if we’re talking about actually trading Nugent-Hopkins, which I think is a horrible idea UNLESS the team gets back a young two-way center who’s ceiling is that of a 2nd line center, help in the bottom six and a top four or near top four defenseman OR a top pairing defenseman (aka the oft mentioned Seth Jones). For example:
Mika Zibanejad, Curtis Lazar, and Cody Ceci/Patrick Wiercioch.
I think a player like Marc Methot would serve the team better but unlikely to be moved given his playing relationship with Erik Karlsson.
PC likes a strong, hard team, and this group is anything but. Only so much room for softer skill, so changes will be made.
I like Zibanejad’s and Lazar’s physical game when they’re not producing offense and their versatility when it come to positional play. I’m not sure why Nuge falls into that newly-formed category of “soft skilled” given his eagerness to grind down low and get to the puck first on a forecheck but Mark Spector is the fella that labeled him, so I guess we’d have to ask him.
I can’t imagine the Senators being willing to give up so many assets for one player but Nugent-Hopkins isn’t just any player. He’ll be one of the best two-way centers in the league inside 3 years and having a Turris/RNH combo down the middle would be a fine proposition.
The new McDavid inspired design! Click the pic and get yours today!
I don’t reckon the Oilers need to trade Nugent-Hopkins because I think he’s just going through a tough spell comparable to that of say Sidney Crosby from 2 weeks ago or Claude Giroux from a couple of seasons ago. Players go though peaks and valleys. It happens. Get over it. Move on. You don’t see Pittsburgh or Philly entertaining offers on their top players do you?
As for Eberle, I’m fine with dealing him. Trading Ebs and Justin Schultz to get that upgrade on defence to me sounds like a sound plan. Jultz will never be worth what he’s going to be asking for this summer so it’s best to cut bait and move on. Elliotte Friedman eluded to a 3-way deal that has since collapsed between St.Louis, the Islanders, and the Oilers in today’s 30 Thoughts. If we are the speculating kind, and we are, I’d say the major names involved there were Shattenkirk, Hamonic and Eberle.
But for me, trading Eberle had better bring back a solid NHLer with experience. I’d want him to be a ‘hard’ player as Todd McLellan likes his players to be but I wouldn’t want him to be Colton Teubert or Andy Sutton, even though Sutton was pure entertainment when he played in Edmonton. You definitely want a Travis Hamonic/Dougie Hamilton type player if you’re trading Eberle. You also want said player to be right-handed.
Who’d I target of Hamonic wasn’t in the plans? I think I’d look to Florida. I’d suss out Erik Gudbranson’s availability. I think he’s on par with Hamilton and Hamonic but not as good offensively.
Edmonton needs a player of Gudbranson’s ilk. A pure shutdown defensive defender who’s a killer and from all accounts a wonderful locker room guy. Standing 6’5″ and weighing in at 220… Tell me you wouldn’t want a guy like that on the Oilers blue line. He’ll bring you zero offense if you’re wondering but that’s not his game.
Would the Panthers be keen on this sort of deal? Well, I’d say no at first glance because Gudbranson and Willie Mitchell are the Panthers shutdown pairing. But with that said, the team has Alex Petrovic and Dmitri Kulikov out with injury right now. I reckon Petrovic would be a prime candidate to take Gudbranson’s spot if a deal could be made. Mike Matheson and Ian McCoshen are also on their way up and apart from Kulikov, they’re lacking an offensive blueliner like Justin Schultz.
I believe they have Jussi Jokinen playing a tad high in the lineup and perhaps they’d like to see Jonathan Huberdeau playing left wing. Also, they have zero depth on the RW…
I don’t think you deal Eberle and Schultz for Gudbranson alone but I think it’s a helluva starting point.
So how would you feel if the Oilers parted with 93, 19 and 14 but brought in Zibanejad, Lazar, Ceci, and Gudbranson, etc? Let me know in the comments below!
I’ll leave you with this quote from the beloved Lowetide:
If Peter Chiarelli trades Ryan Nugent-Hopkins, that will probably be the thing we remember him for, and it will not be a good memory. A trade of RNH leaves the team (once again) completely vulnerable at center, with two extremely young men on skill lines. I would suggest to you if Nuge leaves, a (bigger) center should be the return. I do not see the wisdom in robbing Peter to pay Paul.
Connor McDavid has only played 13 games for the Oilers, but he has already made a large impact. He is the team’s 2nd leading scorer and 19th in the league (as of Nov. 3, 2015) with 12 points (5 G, 7 A), plays 2nd line center, the 2nd unit power-play, and even given some responsibility in taking on short-handed minutes. No surprise, then, that having his clavicle broken after losing his balance (thanks to Flyers’ defenseman, Manning) and falling into the boards, undergoing surgery, and months of expected recovery has hit the team hard. The kid was impressing the hell out of everyone. I’m sure the disappointment in losing him is being felt throughout the locker room. Perhaps I’m rubbing salt into the team’s wounds, but I would like to go deeper into the analytics of missing McDavid.
First, I present a table of McDavid’s contributions at even-strength (5v5), specifically, his individual production rate (points/60 min), Scoring Chances, and High-Danger Scoring Chances (i.e., scoring chances from the slot). His implied contributions are noted in his relative shot metrics, specifically, on-ice relative to off-ice (e.g., SAT% Rel) & relative-to-team average (e.g., SC% RelTM). To be clear, relative shot metrics show changes in the team’s shot metrics when the player is on the ice. Although relative metrics are group measures, we assume it measures a player’s individual contribution to the group measure.
McDavid leads the team in production at 2.7 points per hour, which also ranks 29th compared to league forwards. He is only 2nd to Hall in relative Shot Attempt differential (SAT%). Without him on the ice, the Oilers average SAT% is 46.8%. With him on the ice, the Oilers lead the possession game with a SAT% of 51.6%. Separating offense from defense, the team is generating more offense with McDavid on the ice, but he seems to have more of an impact on shot attempt suppression. In particular, compared to the team average, with McDavid on the ice the team generates 2.6 more shot attempts and suppresses 3.6 more shot attempts per hour. The team’s Scoring Chance and High-Danger Scoring Chance differentials are also improved with McDavid.
However, his low individual Scoring Chance rate (5.4 per hour) does suggest that he is not shooting enough. If we look at regular shot rate–4.6 per hour–it is an abysmal 309th among forwards. Hall, who is among the top 30, has more than double that at 10.4 shots per hour. McDavid’s 5v5 scoring rate of 21.4% is unsustainable, so if he’s going to get 30+ goals, he’s going to have up his shot frequency.
WOWY (With-or-Without-You) tables from David Johsnon’s puckalytics.com provide useful information on how certain combinations of players perform when playing together. Below we see how McDavid appears to effect Pouliot’s and Yakupov’s shot attempt metrics.
All 3 benefit in playing with each other. Their combined SAT% (52%) is greater than any of their own shot attempt differentials when playing apart from each other. Yakupov, in particular, improves by almost 6.7 percentage points (45.3% to 52%).
I was interested to see whether his improvement was more on the offensive side or defensive side. The green squares on the right highlight which improved most for each player. For McDavid, the Oilers have more offense–4.1 more shot attempts generated–when he plays with Pouliot and Yakupov then when he does not. But the most dramatic improvement is in Pouliot’s and Yakupov’s defensive metrics. When Pouliot is playing with McDavid (and Yakupov), the Oilers allow 11 fewer shot attempts per hour than when Pouliot is playing separately. Similarly, when Yakupov is on the ice with McDavid (and Pouliot), the Oilers are allowing 14 fewer shot attempts per hour. We all expected more offense with McDavid on the ice, but did we expect better defense? I know I didn’t.
McDavid’s impact on the team has not only been in individual production, in which he leads the team in even-strength scoring rate. Looking at shot metrics, he helps tilt the ice toward the offensive zone, but not only that, he appears to make an impact on defense, especially on his line-mates Yakupov and Pouliot. Losing McDavid does leave a big hole on the team, which will be most strongly felt by his line-mates.
Eberle returning to the line up will help immensely. Based on Ryan Stimson’s Passing Project data from last season, Eberle was Edmonton’s most effective passer, even better than Hall. As good as Eberle is, though, he is not a center. I’ll be interested to see how the team adjusts without McDavid. What we do know is that they won’t be the same.
Thanks for reading and please leave your comments below. What do you think will happen to the Oilers without McDavid?
